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This paper addresses 'deeper economic integration' 1 -the idea that regional integration, by addressing institutional, …nancial, regulatory and infrastructure issues using, for example, harmonisation and mutual recognition agreements, 2 can promote trade beyond what can be attained by tari¤ removal alone. In particular, I analyse the likely impact of the recent accession of several Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) to the European Union. To this end, I derive estimates of aggregate border costs, including many of which are not explicit trade barriers. 3 These are inferred by comparing actual trade with that predicted from country size and transport costs. The novel aspect is the use of a fully modelconsistent procedure for identifying such costs, by calibrating a multi-country Dixit-Stiglitz general equilibrium model directly upon observed trade ‡ows.
The conclusions are that trade patterns in 1997 are consistent with border costs between the existing EU and accession states of between 0 and 33 per cent. If these barriers were overcome by deeper economic integration, one might expect overall trade between these areas to increase by 50-100 per cent, leading to gains in income of 10-20 per cent for the accession states and small gains for the existing EU members. While the conclusions broadly agree with previous studies, the implied gains are, if anything, somewhat more optimistic.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the derivation and economic role of border costs. Section 3 outlines the calibration and general equilibrium methodology, especially the model-consistent calibration methodology, as well as the data used. In section 
Border costs and the gains from the Single Market
Early studies of European integration, e.g. Brown et al (1995) , concentrated on the removal of tari¤s and formal non-tari¤ barriers (NTBs). These are relatively straightforward to identify, although the precise nature of the simulation model (usually computable general equilibrium (CGE)) will a¤ect estimates of gains and losses. However, most formal barriers between the EU and the CEECs were removed in the mid 1990s by the Europe Agreements.
The issue has then moved to the e¤ects of CEEC accession to the Single Market, with its associated mix of regulatory harmonisation and mutual recognition agreements, intended to remove regulatory barriers to trade. Such barriers are hard to quantify, since national regimes impose a complex mixture of technical and administrative costs. 4 The literature on trade costs has recently been extensively covered by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) . I concentrate here on aspects pertinent to European enlargement, and to the integration of trade costs into a general equilibrium model. Costs can be divided into explicit tari¤ and non-tari¤ barriers and transport costs and the harder-to-identify costs associated with product standards and border controls. These can be estimated by 'bottom-up'or 'top-down'methods. The former rely on surveying …rms for technical data, …nding estimates of border queues and the like. This is by no means easy, although some studies -e.g. Zahariadis (2002) -do make attempts at such measurement. 5 F o r P e e r R e v i e w
Estimated gravity models
Studies such as LeJour et al (2001) or the literature surveyed in Anderson and Wincoop (2004) derive costs by inference from trading patterns, using gravity models, on the grounds that 'bottom-up' estimates may miss many of the costs involved. If a pair of countries trades much less than might normally be expected, then we might well infer that there is some cost obstructing that trade. Tari¤s, NTBs and transport costs can be deducted, leaving an estimate for the net e¤ect of regulations, currency conversion costs and even the informational costs of …nding trade partners where trade has been di¢ cult in the past (see Rauch (1999) , Edwards (2006) ).
Trade is usually compared to an assumed underlying gravity framework, using equations (in logs) for trade in good i between exporting country, c; and importing country, cc; of the form:
X i;c;cc denotes exports, Y is GDP and d is distance between capitals of c and cc. Theory suggests that trade should be roughly proportional to the product of country sizes and inversely proportional to distance. Gravity models can be empirical or more theory-driven (see Bergstrand (1989) , Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) ).
While gravity equations usually work reasonably well for trade between large subsets of countries, there is a clear mis…t in the case of the national borders of the importing country.
Trade within almost any country substantially exceeds than that with neighbouring countries, even after taking account of distance. This 'missing trade'can be very substantial 6 , on Turkish exporters only,. Despite their intentions, the EU Single Market and introduction of the Single Currency are far from eliminating home bias across member states. Nevertheless, there are also limited regional bias e¤ects linked to the regional trade bloc border. These are potentially particularly important when we come to analyse the impact of Single Market enlargement.
A fuller gravity model could therefore be written (in logs) as:
where Dd is a set of dummies for border e¤ects, with D EU set to 1 if both c and cc are EU members, otherwise set to zero. T M i;c;cc is the tari¤ on imports of i from c to cc.
T E i;c;cc is the export tari¤ levied by country c on country cc. y c and y cc represent income per capita, which can also be shown to have signi…cant e¤ects. In the LeJour et al (2001) study, estimated trade between EU members in the late 1990s was between 0-250 % higher than that between EU members and the CEECs.
Cost estimation
To estimate border costs, we also need estimates of demand and supply elasticities. Ideally, these should be consistent with the estimated e¤ects of tari¤s and formal NTBs. In addition, it is necessary to make an assumption whether border costs are …xed or variable with respect to trade. The standard response is to assume they are 'iceberg'costs, which eat up a …xed rules specify di¤erent technical speci…cations, but which have no tangible di¤erence in terms of the quality of the good or service experienced by consumers). 8 Unlike a tari¤, an iceberg border cost yields no revenue: consequently its abolition gives a much greater boost to overall incomes.
The above resource cost speci…cation is open to challenge. Many trading costs (e.g. the redesign of a good, or testing a variety just once to meet di¤erent standards), may impose a lump-sum cost on importers. If producers are identical, then there will be a threshold level of lump-sum cost of market entry. The resource cost of this may be greater or less than that of an iceberg cost, depending upon elasticities and the scale of reduction in observed trade volumes, but numerical analysis suggests that, if entry is seen to have been deterred, the cost of a lump-sum barrier must be high. 9 The idea that regulatory di¤erences are of the 'pure horizontal'variety is open to criticism (see Edwards, 2003) . Di¤erent standards may be better suited to the di¤erent natonal tastes. Higher standards may raise consumer welfare, though at the expense of producers.
Despite these objections, I continue to use the iceberg cost assumption in this paper, partly for consistency with previous studies and partly due to its relative simplicity of 8 See, again, Maskus and Wilson (2001) or Edwards (2003) for more detail. 9 The author's calculations indicate that, for a demand elasticity of 4, the threshold lump-sum entry cost imposes a higher welfare loss than the iceberg trade cost consistent with a halving of trade volumes. 
Speci…cation of the simulation model
The most appropriate simulation tool for major trade changes is usually held to be a multicountry, multi-sector CGE model. The neoclassical Heckscher-Ohlin model framework is not seen as realistic, since it only allows for trade in one direction. The major alternatives are the Armington formulation -a somewhat ad hoc model where producers within a country are perfectly competitive, but di¤erent countries'goods are di¤erentiated -and the Dixit-Stiglitz (D-S) formulation, which is explicitly derived from a 'love-of-variety' model of consumer demand, and usually assumes Chamberlinian monopolistic competition in the long run between producers of di¤erentiated varieties. Under many circumstances, both the Armington and the D-S models share many behavioural properties (downward-sloping demand curves, improvements in consumer utility from being able to spread demand across a variety of sources), although the latter can also incorporate price mark-ups and potential gains from capacity rationalisation (see Krugman, 1979, Baldwin and Venables, 1995) .
Where inputs have a variety e¤ect and where transport costs are high, the D-S formulation can result in agglomeration economies, making the model prone to multiple equilibria. 3 
Methodology of this study
In common with the 'top-down'studies summarised above, I derive implicit trade costs from observed trade. However, unlike previous work, rather than estimating equations, I derive residual border e¤ects by direct calibration of a theoretical D-S model (see below), which are then fully consistent with the model used for simulation. I calibrate residual border e¤ects for imports and exports between each pair of countries (constructing averages for intra-EU trade by model-consistent CES aggregation). This compares to the more parsimonious set of dummies used in most gravity studies, which constrain many residual border e¤ects to be equal. I also use direct estimates of transport costs from the GTAP project, rather than arc distances. In addition, compared to gravity estimation, more speci…c account is taken of the importance of relative output prices, calibrating for revealed comparative costs on the basis of a certain set of restrictive assumptions has been made about border e¤ects. 10 
Derivation of border and comparative production costs
The theoretical relationship between the D-S model and the gravity model is well-established since Bergstrand (1989) , and forms the basis for the calibration in this paper. Since the calibration technique is novel, I outline it in detail. The subscript i is dropped throughout this section. I assume goods are consumed in countries c 2 1:::C, which I also index as cc.
Imports of good g into country cc are Q g;cc . Total consumer utility in country cc is assumed 7 
where is the elasticity of substitution between goods varieties, and c;cc is an iceberg cost.
Setting the marginal utility of consumption of g equal to its relative price and rearranging:
where c;cc is the proportionate transport cost and t c;cc is the net contribution of import and export tari¤s, subsidies and the tari¤ equivalents of NTBs. P c is the selling price of goods from country c at the point of export, while cc is an aggregate consumer price index for cc.
Next, rewrite (4) in terms of observable variables. The nominal value of exports from c to cc, E c;cc is the number of goods varieties produced in country c, n c , times sales per good, Q g;cc (g 2 c) times the export price P c , upscaled by (1 + c;cc ) to take account of the transport cost . U cc equals total expenditure in cc, Y cc divided by the aggregate price index cc . n c equals output X c , divided by the turnover of a 'representative'…rm, T c . Hence
For cc = c we can replace E c;cc with H cc (home use). For H cc ; cc;cc = t cc;cc = 0. This 8 (5), and dividing by the version for H cc gives us:
We can rearrange this to put (1 c;cc ) on the left hand side, and if we assume c;cc = 0 for c = cc; we can simplify somewhat:
An interesting result is found if we multiply together these expressions for trade in both directions between a pair of countries, c and cc, since a lot of terms can then be eliminated:
where the tilde represents adjustment for tari¤s, NTBs and transport costs. If the geometric average volume of trade between a pair of countries, once tari¤s and transport costs have been corrected for, is signi…cantly smaller than that of home-based consumption in the two countries, then there must be residual border costs present. Assuming residual border trade costs are the same in each direction, then
Once an estimated value for the elasticity of substitution, has been chosen, all the other terms on the right hand side of (8) are given, so that, for given observed output, consumption and trade, the higher the value of the trade cost, c;cc , the lower will be the implicit trade cost in the other direction, cc;c . We can therefore use data on observed trade 9 
The model for simulations
Simulations on the removal of these trade costs are carried out using a multi-country static However, it is more consistent with the elasticities traditionally used in Armington-based general equilibrium models. A key factor may be time-scale (in this model I am interested in medium-run simulations, where perhaps long-run elasticities would be higher).
There are also iceberg transport costs, iceberg unspeci…ed trade costs (see above) and tari¤s, as well as taxes/subsidies on output and use of a commodity.
Firms are imperfectly competitive, and charge markups dependent on their market
shares.Treatment of the number of …rms within an industry and country is an issue here. 1 1 The love of variety characteristic of the Dixit-Stiglitz model requires the substitution elasticity > 1: Note that the original Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) paper was written in terms of a substitution parameter, = ( 1)= ; which correspondingly has to lie in the range between zero and unity. Krugman, 1979) . The small loss of consumer variety from the shakeout is o¤set by a larger gain from allowing …rms to reap economies of scale (see Baldwin and Venables, 1995) . However, endogenised …rm numbers are really a long-run assumption, since …xed costs may not be avoidable in the short-or medium-run.
For this reason, I retain a 'medium-run'formulation, with a …xed number of …rms in each country/industry.
The top level of the consumption function uses a Cobb-Douglas structure.
Data
I use the GTAP version 5 database, which has harmonised trade and input-output data for regions across the world in 1997. I aggregate data into 8 goods 12 and 10 regions 13 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   F  o  r  P  e  e  r  R  e  v  i  e  w For trade and protection I use 4 principal data series from GTAP for these countries and regions:exports at market (i.e. domestic) prices (VXMD), exports at world prices (VXWD), imports at world prices (VIWS) and imports at market prices (ie sales prices in the importing country before indirect tax) (VIMS). Trade volumes, transport costs and tari¤s are derived from these series. 15 
Results

Border costs
In 1997, imports from the CEECs into the EU faced sizeable barriers in agriculture and food processing, but formal barriers elsewhere had been removed under the Europe Agreements.
CES weighted averages of the barriers facing CEEC exports to the EU varied between 10 and 31 per cent for agriculture, while for food processing they were 25-54 per cent. Even after taking account of these formal trade barriers, there is still a considerable shortfall compared to intra-EU trade. Table 1 shows calibrated comparative costs and country bias. In this case, average 'excess' bias on EU-CEEC trade is assumed to be the same in both directions. The …rst column shows calibrated production costs relative to the EU. This suggests the CEECs two are not on the 2005 EU accession list, whereas the 3 Baltic States, as well as Cyprus and Malta, are.
1 5 VIWS -VXWD is the transport cost margin. VXWD -VXMD is net export tax/subsidy, plus the GTAP estimates of the tari¤ equivalent of some quantitative trade restrictions whose revenue accrues to the exporting country.
VIMS -VIWS is net import tax/subsidy and the tari¤ equivalent of remaining NTBs. Correction is made for some data errors in GTAP V5. I have removed tari¤s on trade between the EU and CEECs other than in agriculture and food processing. The second column is average calibrated home bias between EU states, which is far from having been eliminated by the Single Market. The remaining two columns show 1 6 Comparative costs in services would, of course, be expected to be lower in poorer countries (see Balassa, 1964) . However, it seems that, at least for Poland, the low relative costs apply to all sectors. Only for the Other CEEC region does there seem to be clear evidence supporting the Balassa-Samuelson relationship. 17 . These vary from slightly negative (for Polish food processing only) to around 15% for Polish manufactures, 10-13% for other CEEC manufactures and 9-14 per cent for Hungarian manufactures. For agriculture they are around 7-10%. The key assumption is that Single Market entry can remove these costs. Table 2 (below) shows the e¤ects on consumer welfare in each region resulting from (1) customs union (removal of the tari¤s on agriculture and foodstu¤s and harmonisation of external tari¤s with those of the EU) and (2) assumed abolition of iceberg unspeci…ed trading costs, i ; when countries join the Single Market. Customs union has only small welfare e¤ects, though these generally bene…t the accession states by 0-2 The Former Soviet Union and LDCs also see small gains, so that trade diversion e¤ects are 1 7 If costs were asymmetric, then equation (8) Table 3 shows the change in trade volumes: these are typically of the order 50-100% between the EU countries and CECs on accession. 2. Prices in the EU generally fall as a result of the saving in costs of inputs (the unskilled wage in Germany is set to 1 in this model, to act as a numeraire). However in the CEEC countries -especially Poland -output prices generally rise towards EU levels.
Enlargement simulations
3. Relative skilled/unskilled wages do not change greatly in any country, though there are sizeable gains to both types of labour in Poland in particular. The lack of distributional changes between types of labour may partly be because a …xed factor (land) in two sectors absorbs much of the e¤ects of changes in output prices. 19 
Comparison with other studies 4.3.1 Border costs
The calibrated residual border costs vary between 7 and 15 per cent of total cost of goods traded -which suggest they are roughly twice as large as implied by 'bottom-up'estimates such as Harrison et al (1996) or Zahariadis, 2002 . I suggest this represents a general discrepancy between gravity models and attempts to quantify the e¤ects of observable barriers. 20 Possible reasons are that di¤erent regulatory regimes involve more inconvenience and uncertainty to trading …rms than simple cost estimates imply, or that there may be …xed costs involved which have not properly been modelled, or alternatively that trade costs are magni…ed by the presence of informational barriers (see Edwards, 2006 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 A tentative conclusion would be that the 80-100% surge in Polish-EU trade predicted by the model has e¤ectively happened in anticipation of accession (2004 saw particularly rapid trade growth). 23 The timing of this surge should not be seen as surprising, given that formal trade barriers (except in agriculture and food products) were removed in the mid-1990s, while implementation of the various EU regulations and standards has been a gradual process. The degree to which Poland's rapid GDP growth can be attributed to rising trade with the EU would require much more detailed study: if one assumes that there are up-front costs in changing a country's regulatory regime, and that developing products and market ties to new countries also involves search and learning-by-doing, 24 then, the long-run welfare gains could take longer to emerge than the increase in trade. with those which were not. This involves assumptions about the nature and speci…cation of the barriers imposed by di¤erent regulatory regimes, and the underlying structure of the economy. With these assumptions, and using a Dixit-Stiglitz type general equilibrium 2 3 Some of the trade growth observed would, of course, re ‡ect underlying steady-state economic growth. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 The model is based on an imperfectly competitive structure, using a Dixit-Stiglitz framework. 26 In this paper I have used the simpler version of the model, where the number of goods produced within each country, c, and industry, i, n c;i , is …xed. Each good is produced by one …rm and denoted g. However, unlike many Armington models, it does allow for monopolistic markups. I also allow capital to ‡ow between countries.
Summary and Conclusions
Production of goods.
Each …rm combines labour, land and capital using a Cobb-Douglas function to form a value added input: i.e.
where V A is value added (quantity), K is capital, D is land which is sectorally …xed. ; k and d are scale and share parameters. Labour is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of unskilled labour, LU , and skilled labour, LS, u and s are share parameters.
All …rms g within i in a given country, c, are identical. I normalise c;i = 1. In equilibrium, 2 6 Dixit and Stiglitz (1977 where W U , W S; R and LDP are factor rents.
The price of value added,
Higher level of production function. 
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The marginal per unit price including tax and subsidies:
Trade and the aggregation of goods.
I use a two-stage nested utility function. Total demand for industry bundle i in c is a
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate T U c;i :
where U g;c is use of g in c and is a parameter re ‡ecting compatibility and home bias in consumption. The substitution parameter = ( 1)= , where is the elasticity of substitution between g in i.
If depends only on country of origin, cc, country of use, c, and industry, i, then we sum, …rst, the various varieties g 2 (cc \ i); produced in each country cc, and then sum across countries:
If all …rms within an industry/country are identical in size, then we can write T U cc;i = X c n ci i;c;cc (QU i;c;cc =n c;i ) 
The price P U of the aggregate bundle T U :
Consumption (top level of the nested utility function).
Utility U T is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate across i of consumption CN i :
Competition and pricing.
Within export markets, it is assumed that a …rm has a very small market share and so its own-price elasticity is . By contrast, in the home market, the …rm's market share S g;c is assumed to be signi…cant, so the …rm's price elasticity
where, if HU denotes consumption from domestic suppliers and P T i;c;cc is the selling price, SM c;i = 1 HU c;i P T i;c;c =V U c;i : The overall own price elasticity is a weighted average from home and export markets: 
The price of good g including monopoly markups is therefore:
Transport costs
Transport costs are proportional to value, so the price including transport, P T R i;c;cc = P M c;i (1 + T marginc i;c;cc ):
This is an iceberg cost, so, if X i;c;cc is the quantity of i leaving country c for country cc, the amount which arrives in country cc is:
Tari¤s
Tari¤s are expressed as a percentage rate, so the price including tari¤s is P T i;c;cc = P T R i;c;cc (1 + tarif f i;c;cc =100): The consumer price, P U U i;c;cc , also includes a proportional tax on use:
P U U i;c;cc = P T i;c;cc (1 + U SET AX cc;i ): 
29 Capital is fully mobile between industries, and may or not be mobile between countries:
Where KM c is non-zero (so that there are international transfers of capital) the global total of KM is set to zero. X c KM c = 0:
The rate of return on capital in each industry is equated to the national rate of return, RB c :
Where capital is allowed to move internationally,
Land is sectorally immobile, so LD c;i = LD c;i :
Variety of goods
For sensitivity analysis, the …xed …rm numbers version of the model assumes the total number of …rms in each country is …xed:
n c;i = n c;i : The top level utility function is Cobb-Douglas in functional form (so the elasticity of substitution between consumption of the produce of each industry, i, is unity). Share parameters for each product class are calibrated from value shares in total expenditure.
The lower level utility function has an elasticity of substitution between goods g in industry i of : This is assumed to equal 4 in all industries.
Supply side: technology is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas, so elasticities of substitution between inputs are unity, and share parameters can be directly calibrated from total costs (once monopoly pro…t has been subtracted). 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
